We propose a model of environmental overcompliance in a duopoly setting where consumers are environmentally concerned and may patronise the product they buy, …rms set their green investment to abate the impact of productivity on pollution and a government sets the environmental standard with the aim to maximise welfare. We show that, with no patronising consumers, overcompliance is unilateral by the …rm with higher quality standard under Bertrand behaviour, whereas both …rms may overcomply under Cournot competition if the environmental impact of production is su¢ ciently low. Conversely with patronising consumers, overcompliance is unilateral with low environmental impact of production under price competition, and both …rm overcomply under quantity competition.
Introduction
Environmental overcompliance takes place when …rms voluntarily conform to environmental standards higher than the ones required by the environmental regulation. There is a large evidence documenting the growing of environmental overcompliance (see Lyon and Maxwell, 2004 for a discussion).
The economic literature proposed several explanation of environmental overcompliance. One argument relies upon the assumption that consumers are environmentally concerned and thus they reward …rms that overcomply by redirecting their demand towards them (Arora and Gangopadhyay 1995 (from now on, AG95), Bansal and Gangopadhyay, 2003 , and Bagnoli and Watts, 2003, inter alia). Another explanation is that overcompliance has the aim to preempt the enactment of tighter regulation (Maxwell et al., 2000, and Lyon and Maxwell, 2003 , inter alia). Finally, Denicolò (2008) suggests that a …rm can overcomply to signal an uninformed government about low overcompliance costs and thus leading the government to require a tougher regulation. Here overcompliance has the purpose of raising rival's costs.
The present analysis nests in the approach related to the presence of green consumers. In particular, AG95 and Bansal and Gangopadhyay (2003) examine a vertically di¤erentiated duopoly where …rms sell a good di¤ering in environmental quality (due to higher environmental production standards) and compete in prices. They show that overcompliance may emerge but [i] the environmental standard is exogenously determined and thus not established through social welfare maximisation,
[ii] they do not consider the presence of the environmental externality (which in turn a¤ects the endogenously-determined environmental standard) and
[iii] competition in quantities is not taken into account.
In this paper we take the AG95's standpoint by considering the presence of an environmental externality, and endogenously setting the environmental standard through social welfare maximisation by the government. Further, we evaluate the introduction of an environmental standard with Cournot competition. Finally, we investigate the case in which consumers are green and "patronise"the good they choose to buy, i.e., they speci…cally care about the environmental impact of the good they buy.
Our results show that, with no patronising consumers, an environmental standard quality brings about unilateral overcompliance by the …rm with higher quality standard under Bertrand behaviour, whereas both …rms overcomply under Cournot competition if the environmental impact of production is su¢ ciently low. The result can be explained by the interaction between the price e¤ect, that induces the two …rms to increase environmental quality di¤erentiation, and the environmental standard: the …rm with lower environmental standard would lower its price (and thus its environmental quality) in order to acquire consumers that otherwise would not have bought the good, therefore the introduction of an environmental standard would induce an increase in quality. This may not happen under Cournot behaviour competition, since competition is softer and thus less di¤erentiation occurs.
Therefore the low-environmental-quality …rm may set its quality above the standard. On the other hand, the …rm with higher environmental quality raises its price (and quality) because of the price e¤ect and by doing this it overcomplies.
Conversely, when we consider patronising consumers, overcompliance is 
The model
We consider a duopoly market for homogeneous products supplied by singleproduct …rms. Production entails a negative environmental externality s > 0:
Firms can adopt a cleaning technology q 2 [0; Q] that reduces emissions, at a cost c (q) : We denote the …rm that invests more in the cleaning technology and its competitor as G and B; respectively, so that q G > q B : From now on, we will denote the good produced by …rm G as "green" and the good produced by …rm B as "brown".
The demand side is modelled à la Mussa and Rosen (1978) . There is a continuum of consumers di¤ering in the environmental concern, and the consumer types are identi…ed by the index , uniformly distributed with density equal to one in the interval [0; ] (thus total demand is equal to ). Parameter represents the consumers'marginal willingness to pay for a good produced according to green standards. Each consumer is assumed to buy at most one unit of the good in order to maximise the following surplus function:
where p i is the market price at which that variety is supplied by …rm i = G; B:
Therefore, the consumer who is indi¤erent between q G and q B is identi…ed by the level of marginal willingness to pay b that solves
. Thus, market demand for the green
We assume partial market coverage, so that there is another consumer, identi…ed by e , who is indi¤erent between buying q B or not buying at all:
whereby e = p B =q B and the demand for the inferior variety is
Accordingly, we can de…ne consumer surplus as follows:
This is what one needs to use in order to model Bertrand behaviour, while inverse demands
are to be used under Cournot competition.
On the supply side, we denote as
the pro…t functions of the green and brown-quality …rm, respectively, where c i (q i ) > 0; c 0 i ; c 00 i > 0 and the marginal cost of production is normalised to zero. Production entails a negative environmental external-
, with b > 0, measuring the negative impact of production on the environment. 1 Social welfare is determined by the sum of pro…ts and consumer surplus, minus the environmental externality:
It is important noting that the consumers'utility function can be modi…ed by embedding the amount of pollution produced without changing any result. 
Price competition
To begin with, the optimal prices for any given quality pair are:
where the superscript N stands for Nash equilibrium. The explicit derivation is omitted as it can be found in Ronnen (1991) .
We now turn to the …rst stage in which environmental quality is chosen.
We will prove our results by manipulating the set of the …rst order conditions in the two alternative cases under consideration, i.e., with or without the presence of an environmental standard. The relevant pro…t functions are:
With no environmental standard, the …rst order conditions for non cooperative pro…t maximisation are:
We are now in a position to investigate how the investment in environmental quality is a¤ected by the introduction of an environmental standard. To perform this task, we follow a procedure by now consolidated in the existing literature on minimum quality standards. In the regulated case, the government introduces an environmental standard aimed at a¤ecting directly the behaviour of …rm B. Firm G's FOC remains unchanged, while the regulator solves:
For any pair of generic qualities (q G ; q B ) ; overcompliance from …rm G occurs once that the environmental regulation is binding (and therefore brings about an increase in both environmental qualities) if @W=@q B > @ B =@q B : The presence of a negative externality implies that
Note also that both …rms'pro…ts are positive for all
and that
The foregoing discussion can be summarised in i.e., …rm B sets its quality at a lower level to acquire consumers that otherwise would not have bought the good. Therefore the environmental standard is always above the quality level of …rm B. Still for the competition e¤ect, …rm G raises its environmental quality at a higher level than the environmental standard.
Quantity competition
In this section we investigate whether the introduction of environmental standard of production leads to overcompliance in an industry where …rms compete in quantities. To begin with, we characterise optimal outputs for any given environmental quality pair:
The explicit derivation of the Cournot equilibrium is omitted as it is known from Motta (1993) .
We now turn to the …rst stage where the environmental game takes place.
Like for price competition, we will prove our results by manipulating the set of the …rst order conditions. The relevant pro…t functions are:
Without regulation of environmental quality, the …rst order conditions for non cooperative pro…t maximisation are:
The optimal regulation of environmental quality requires solving the following:
For any pair of generic qualities (q G ; q B ) ; the introduction of a minimum environmental standard leads …rm G to overcompliance if the environmental regulation is binding, i.e., if …rm B will raise its environmental quality in order to comply, because in turn this would lead …rm G to raise its environmental quality. This occurs if @W=@q L > @ L =@q L : However, if the minimum environmental standard is not binding, this would imply that both …rms are already overcomplying. By examining the sign of the di¤erence
whereby
and conversely. Therefore, if b is not large enough, both …rms overcomply, whereas for b su¢ ciently large, only …rm G overcomplies. Finally, note that both …rms'pro…ts are positive for all
The foregoing discussion can be summarised in Under Cournot competition the incentive in overcompliance is stronger than in the Bertrand case. In particular, both …rms overcomply if the marginal impact of production on pollution is su¢ ciently low. The intuition of this result can be spelled out as follows. Cournot competition is softer than Bertrand competition. The competition e¤ect implies that it is not necessary for …rm B to lower the price (and therefore the environmental quality) as much as in the Bertrand case. If the marginal impact of pollution is su¢ ciently low, the competition e¤ect is such that …rm B keeps the environmental quality higher than the socially optimal environmental standard. If conversely production has a strong impact on pollution, then the regulated environmental standard would set the environmental quality to a higher level than the one who maximises the private pro…t of the B …rm, because of the strong contraction of market coverage which in this case more than o¤set the competition e¤ect aforementioned.
Patronising consumers
In this section we analyse markets in which consumers speci…cally care for the pollution of the good they buy. We refer to them as "patronising"consumers as the speci…cally patronise the green quality of their purchased product.
Unlike the previous scenario, in this case to consider the speci…c pollution of the good purchased in the utility function makes a di¤erence according to the product quality. Therefore a consumer's utility function is now
where b=q i is the individual pollution due to the production of the good purchased. Thus, the consumer who is indi¤erent between q G and q B is identi…ed by the level of marginal willingness to pay b that solves
and therefore
The consumer e p who is indi¤erent between buying q B or not buying at all is:
Thus, market demand for the green and the brown good are x G = b p and x B = b p e p . We now consider the exercise developed in Section 3 in the case of patronising consumers.
Price competition
With price competition, the pro…ts G and B in the second stage are:
Solving the FOCs w.r.t. prices yields:
In the regulated case, the regulator solves:
and conversely.
The foregoing discussion can be summarised in Proposition 3 intuitively shows that, if a consumer speci…cally cares about the pollution of the purchased good and the marginal impact of production in pollution is su¢ ciently high, then both …rms would increase the environmental quality level in order to increase the number of customers and thus their pro…ts, irrespective of the socially optimal standard. Now indeed competition is not only related to price di¤erences, like in the cases outlined in the previous section, but it is also related on keeping the environmental quality relatively high in order to satisfy the patronising customers, and this o¤sets the price e¤ect for a high b. When b is not so high instead, then the price e¤ect is stronger and overcompliance is unilateral:
Quantity Competition
With quantity competition, the pro…ts G and B in the second stage are:
Solving the FOCs w.r.t. quantities yields:
In the …rst stage where the environmental game takes place and without regulation of environmental quality, the …rst order conditions for non cooperative pro…t maximisation are:
The foregoing discussion can be summarised in Proposition 4 Under Cournot behaviour and patronising consumers both …rm overcomply to a environmental quality standard.
The reason of this result is the same as for price competition, but now the e¤ect of keeping a high environmental quality in order to acquire patronising consumers is stronger due to the softer competition under Cournot behaviour.
Concluding remarks
We 
